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Abstract
The transmission of monetary policy to the economy is generally thought to have long
and variable lags. In this paper we quantitatively review the modern literature on monetary
transmission in transition and developed countries to provide stylized facts on the average
lag length and the sources of variability. We collect 67 published studies and examine
when prices bottom out after a monetary contraction. The average transmission lag is 29
months, and the maximum decrease in prices reaches 0.9% on average after a one-percentage-
point hike in the policy rate. Transmission lags are longer in developed economies (25–50
months) than in transition economies (10–20 months). We find that the factor most effective
in explaining this heterogeneity is financial development: greater financial development is
associated with slower transmission. Our results also suggest that researchers who use
monthly data instead of quarterly data report systematically faster transmission.
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1 Introduction
Policymakers need to know how long it takes before their actions fully transmit to the economy
and what determines the speed of transmission. A common claim about the transmission
mechanism of monetary policy is that it has “long and variable” lags (Friedman, 1972; Batini
& Nelson, 2001; Goodhart, 2001). This view has been embraced by many central banks and
taken into account during their decision making: most inflation-targeting central banks have
adopted a value between 12 and 24 months as their policy horizon (see, for example, Bank of
England, 1999; European Central Bank, 2010). Theoretical models usually imply transmission
lags of similar length (Taylor & Wieland, 2012), but the results of empirical studies vary widely.
Our paper quantitatively surveys studies that employ vector autoregression (VAR) methods
to investigate the effects of monetary policy shocks on the price level. We refer to the horizon
at which the response of prices becomes the strongest as the transmission lag, and collect 198
estimates from 67 published studies. The estimates of transmission lags in our sample are in-
deed variable, and we examine the sources of variability. The meta-analysis approach allows
us to investigate both how transmission lags differ across countries or in time and how differ-
ent estimation methodologies within the VAR framework affect the results. Meta-analysis is a
set of tools for summarizing the existing empirical evidence; it has been regularly employed in
medical research, but its application has only recently spread to the social sciences, including
economics (Stanley, 2001; Ashenfelter & Greenstone, 2004; Disdier & Head, 2008; Card et al.,
2010; Havranek & Irsova, 2011). By bringing together evidence from a large number of stud-
ies that use different methods, meta-analysis can extract robust results from a heterogeneous
literature.
Several researchers have previously investigated the cross-country differences in monetary
transmission. Ehrmann (2000) examines 13 member countries of the European Union and finds
relatively fast transmission to prices for most of the countries: between 2 and 8 quarters. Only
France, Italy, and the United Kingdom exhibit transmission lags between 12 and 20 quarters. In
contrast, Mojon & Peersman (2003) find that the effects of monetary policy shocks in European
economies are much more delayed, with the maximum reaction occurring between 16 and 20
quarters after the shock. Concerning cross-country differences, Mojon & Peersman (2003) argue
that the confidence intervals are too wide to draw any strong conclusions, but they call for
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further testing of the heterogeneity of impulse responses. Boivin et al. (2008) update the results
and conclude that the adoption of the euro contributed to lower heterogeneity in monetary
transmission among the member countries.
Cecchetti (1999) finds that for a sample of advanced countries transmission lags vary be-
tween 1 and 12 quarters. He links the country-specific strength of monetary policy to a number
of indicators of financial structure, but does not attempt to explain the variation in transmission
lags. In a similar vein, Elbourne & de Haan (2006) investigate 10 new EU member countries
and find that the maximum effects of monetary policy shocks on prices occur between 1 and
10 quarters after the shock. These papers typically look at a small set of countries at a specific
point in time; in contrast, we collect estimates of transmission lags from a vast literature that
provides evidence for 30 different economies during several decades. Moreover, while some of
the previous studies seek to explain the differences in the strength of transmission, they remain
silent about the factors driving transmission speed.
In this paper we attempt to fill this gap and associate the differences in transmission lags
with a number of country and study characteristics. Our results suggest that the transmission
lags reported in the literature really do vary substantially: the average lag, corrected for mis-
specification in some studies, is 29 months, with a standard deviation of 19 months. Transition
economies in our sample exhibit significantly faster transmission than advanced economies, and
the only robust country-specific determinant of the length of transmission is the degree of fi-
nancial development. Concerning variables that describe the methods used by primary studies,
the frequency of the data employed matters for the reported transmission lags.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents descriptive evidence
concerning the differences in transmission lags. Section 3 links the variation in transmission
lags to 33 country- and study-specific variables. Section 4 contains robustness checks. Section 5
summarizes the implications of our key results.
2 Estimating the Average Lag
We attempt to gather all published studies on monetary transmission that fulfill the following
three inclusion criteria. First, the study must present an impulse response of the price level to a
shock in the policy rate (that is, we exclude impulse responses of the inflation rate). Second, the
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impulse response in the study must correspond to a one-percentage-point shock in the interest
rate, or the size of the monetary policy shock must be presented so that we can normalize the
response. Third, we only include studies that present confidence intervals around the impulse
responses—as a simple indicator of quality. The primary studies fulfilling the inclusion criteria
are listed in Table 1. More details describing the search strategy can be found in a related
paper (Rusnak et al., 2012), examining which method choices are associated with reporting the
“price puzzle” (the short-term increase in the price level following a monetary contraction).
Table 1: List of primary studies
Andries (2008) Eickmeier et al. (2009) Mertens (2008)
Anzuini & Levy (2007) Elbourne (2008) Minella (2003)
Arin & Jolly (2005) Elbourne & de Haan (2006) Mojon (2008)
Bagliano & Favero (1998) Elbourne & de Haan (2009) Mojon & Peersman (2001)
Bagliano & Favero (1999) Forni & Gambetti (2010) Mountford (2005)
Banbura et al. (2010) Fujiwara (2004) Nakashima (2006)
Belviso & Milani (2006) Gan & Soon (2003) Normandin & Phaneuf (2004)
Bernanke et al. (1997) Hanson (2004) Oros & Romocea-Turcu (2009)
Bernanke et al. (2005) Horvath & Rusnak (2009) Peersman (2004)
Boivin & Giannoni (2007) Hulsewig et al. (2006) Peersman (2005)
Borys et al. (2009) Jang & Ogaki (2004) Peersman & Smets (2001)
Bredin & O’Reilly (2004) Jarocinski (2009) Peersman & Straub (2009)
Brissimis & Magginas (2006) Jarocinski & Smets (2008) Pobre (2003)
Brunner (2000) Kim (2001) Rafiq & Mallick (2008)
Buckle et al. (2007) Kim (2002) Romer & Romer (2004)
Cespedes et al. (2008) Krusec (2010) Shioji (2000)
Christiano et al. (1996) Kubo (2008) Sims & Zha (1998)
Christiano et al. (1999) Lagana & Mountford (2005) Smets (1997)
Cushman & Zha (1997) Lange (2010) Sousa & Zaghini (2008)
De Arcangelis & Di Giorgio (2001) Leeper et al. (1996) Vargas-Silva (2008)
Dedola & Lippi (2005) Li et al. (2010) Voss & Willard (2009)
EFN (2004) McMillin (2001) Wu (2003)
Eichenbaum (1992)
Notes: The search for primary studies was terminated on September 15, 2010. A list of excluded studies,
with reasons for exclusion, is available in the online appendix.
After imposition of the inclusion criteria, our database contains 198 impulse responses taken
from 67 previously published studies and provides evidence on the monetary transmission mech-
anism for 30 countries, mostly developed and transition economies. The database is available in
the online appendix. For each impulse response we evaluate the horizon at which the decrease
in prices following the monetary contraction reaches its maximum. The literature reports two
general types of impulse responses, both of which are depicted in Figure 1. The left-hand panel
shows a hump-shaped (also called U-shaped) impulse response: prices decrease and bounce back
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Figure 1: Stylized impulse responses
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Notes: The figure depicts stylized examples of the price level’s response to a one-percentage-point increase in the policy
rate. The dashed lines denote the number of months to the maximum decrease in prices.
after some time following a monetary policy shock; the monetary contraction stabilizes prices
at a lower level or the effect gradually dies out. The dashed line denotes the maximum effect,
and we label the corresponding number of months passed since the monetary contraction as the
transmission lag. In contrast, the right-hand panel shows a strictly decreasing impulse response:
prices neither stabilize nor bounce back within the time frame reported by the authors (impulse
response functions are usually constructed for a five-year horizon). In this case the response of
the price level becomes the strongest in the last reported horizon, so we label the last horizon
as the transmission lag.
Researchers often discuss the number of months to the maximum decrease in prices in the
case of hump-shaped impulse responses. On the other hand, researchers rarely interpret the
timing of the maximum decrease in prices for strictly decreasing impulse responses, as the
implied transmission lag often seems implausibly long. Moreover, a strictly decreasing response
may indicate nonstationarity of the estimated VAR system (Lu¨tkepohl, 2005). Nevertheless we
do not limit our analysis to hump-shaped impulse responses since both types are commonly
reported: in the data set we have 100 estimates of transmission lags taken from hump-shaped
impulse responses and 98 estimates taken from strictly decreasing impulse responses. We do
not prefer any particular shape of the impulse response and focus on inference concerning the
average transmission lag, but we additionally report results corresponding solely to hump-shaped
impulse responses.
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Figure 2: Kernel density of the estimated transmission lags
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Notes: The figure is constructed using the Epanechnikov kernel function. The solid vertical line denotes the average number
of months to the maximum decrease in prices taken from all the impulse responses. The dashed line on the left denotes
the average taken from the hump-shaped impulse responses. The dashed line on the right denotes the average taken from
the strictly decreasing impulse response functions.
Table 2: Summary statistics of the estimated transmission lags
Variable Observations Mean Median Std. dev. Min Max
Estimates from all impulse responses 198 33.5 37 19.4 1 60
Hump-shaped impulse responses 100 18.2 15 14.1 1 57
Strictly decreasing impulse responses 98 49.1 48 8.6 24 60
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Figure 2 depicts the kernel density plot of the collected estimates; the figure demonstrates
that the transmission lags taken from hump-shaped impulse responses are, on average, substan-
tially shorter than the lags taken from strictly decreasing impulse response functions. Numerical
details on summary statistics are reported in Table 2. The average of all collected transmis-
sion lags is 33.5 months, but the average reaches 49.1 months for transmission lags taken from
strictly decreasing impulse responses and 18.2 months for hump-shaped impulse responses. In
other words, the decrease in prices following a monetary contraction becomes the strongest, on
average, after two years and three quarters. Our data also suggest that the average magni-
tude of the maximum decrease in prices following a one-percentage-point increase in the policy
rate is 0.9% (for a detailed meta-analysis of the strength of monetary transmission at different
horizons, see Rusnak et al., 2012).
Table 3: Transmission lags differ across countries
Developed economies Transition economies
Economy Average transmission lag Economy Average transmission lag
United States 42.2 Poland 18.7
Euro area 48.4 Czech Republic 14.8
Japan 51.3 Hungary 17.9
Germany 33.4 Slovakia 10.7
United Kingdom 40.4 Slovenia 17.6
France 51.3
Italy 26.6
Notes: The table shows the average number of months to the maximum decrease in prices taken from all the impulse
responses reported for the corresponding country. We only show results for countries for which the literature has
reported at least five impulse responses.
The average of 33.5 is constructed based on data for 30 different countries. To investigate
whether transmission lags vary across countries, we report country-specific averages in Table 3
(we only show results for countries for which we have collected at least five observations from
the literature). We divide the countries into two groups: developed economies and transition
economies. From the table it is apparent that developed countries display much longer trans-
mission lags than transition countries. The developed country with the fastest transmission
of monetary policy actions is Italy: the corresponding transmission lag reaches 26.6 months.
The slowest transmission is found for Japan and France, with a transmission lag equal to 51.3
months. In general, the transmission lags for developed countries seem to vary between ap-
proximately 25 and 50 months. These values sharply contrast with the results for transition
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countries, where all reported transmission lags lie between 10 and 20 months. The result is in
line with Jarocinski (2010), who investigates cross-country differences in transmission and finds
that post-communist economies exhibit faster transmission than Western European countries.
We examine the possible sources of the cross-country heterogeneity in the next section.
3 Explaining the Differences
Two general reasons may explain why the reported transmission lags vary: First, structural
differences across countries may cause genuine differences in the speed of transmission. Second,
characteristics of the data and other aspects of the methodology employed in the primary
studies, such as specification and estimation characteristics, may have a systematic influence on
the reported transmission lag.
We collected 33 potential explanatory variables. Several structural characteristics that may
account for cross-country differences in the monetary transmission mechanism have been sug-
gested in the literature (Dornbusch et al., 1998; Cecchetti, 1999; Ehrmann et al., 2003). There-
fore, to control for these structural differences we include GDP per capita to represent the
country’s overall level of the development, GDP growth and Inflation to reflect other macroe-
conomic conditions in the economy, Financial development to capture the importance of the
financial structure, Openness to cover the exchange rate channel of the transmission mechanism,
and Central bank independence to capture the influence of the institutional setting and cred-
ibility on monetary transmission. These variables are computed as averages over the periods
that correspond to the estimation periods of the primary studies. The sources of the data for
these variables are Penn World Tables, the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, and
the International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics; the central bank indepen-
dence index is extracted from Arnone et al. (2009). We also include variables that control for
data, methodology, and publication characteristics of the primary studies. The definitions of
the variables are provided in Table 4 together with their summary statistics.
Rather than estimating a regression with an ad hoc subset of explanatory variables, we
formally address the model uncertainty inherent in meta-analysis (in other words, many method
variables may be important for the reported speed of transmission, but no theory helps us
select which ones). There are at least two drawbacks to using simple regression in situations
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where many potential explanatory variables exist. First, if we put all potential variables into
one regression, the standard errors get inflated since many redundant variables are included.
Second, sequential testing (or the “general-to-specific” approach) brings about the possibility
of excluding relevant variables.
To address these issues, Bayesian model averaging (BMA) is employed frequently in the
literature on the determinants of economic growth (Fernandez et al., 2001; Sala-I-Martin et al.,
2004; Durlauf et al., 2008; Feldkircher & Zeugner, 2009; Eicher et al., 2011). Recently, BMA has
been used to address other questions as well (see Moral-Benito, 2011, for a survey). The idea
of BMA is to go through all possible combinations of regressors and weight them according to
their model fit. BMA thus provides results robust to model uncertainty, which arises when little
or nothing is known ex ante about the correct set of explanatory variables. An accessible intro-
duction to BMA can be found in Koop (2003); technical details concerning the implementation
of the method are provided by Feldkircher & Zeugner (2009).
Because we consider 33 potential explanatory variables, it is not technically feasible to
enumerate all 233 of their possible combinations; on a typical personal computer this would
take several months. In such cases, Markov chain Monte Carlo methods are used to go through
the most important models. We employ the priors suggested by Eicher et al. (2011), who
recommend using the uniform model prior and the unit information prior for the parameters,
since these priors perform well in forecasting exercises. Following Fernandez et al. (2001), we run
the estimation with 200 million iterations, ensuring a good degree of convergence. Appendix A
provides diagnostics of our BMA estimation; the online appendix provides R and Stata codes.
Table 4: Description and summary statistics of explanatory variables
Variable Description Mean Std. dev.
Country characteristics
GDP per capita The logarithm of the country’s real GDP per capita. 9.880 0.415
GDP growth The average growth rate of the country’s real GDP. 2.644 1.042
Inflation The average inflation of the country. 0.078 0.145
Financial dev. The financial development of the country measured by (domestic
credit to private sector)/GDP.
0.835 0.408
Openness The trade openness of the country measured by (exports + im-
ports)/GDP.
0.452 0.397
CB independence A measure of central bank independence (Arnone et al., 2009). 0.773 0.145
Data characteristics
Monthly =1 if monthly data are used. 0.626 0.485
No. of observations The logarithm of the number of observations used. 4.876 0.661
Continued on the next page
9
Table 4: Description and summary statistics of regression variables (continued)
Variable Description Mean Std. dev.
Average year The average year of the data used (2000 as a base). -9.053 7.779
Specification characteristics
GDP deflator =1 if the GDP deflator is used instead of the consumer price
index as a measure of prices.
0.172 0.378
Single regime =1 if the VAR is estimated over a period of a single monetary
policy regime.
0.293 0.456
No. of lags The number of lags in the model, normalized by frequency:
lags/frequency
0.614 0.373
Commodity prices =1 if a commodity price index is included. 0.626 0.485
Money =1 if a monetary aggregate is included. 0.545 0.499
Foreign variables =1 if at least one foreign variable is included. 0.444 0.498
Time trend =1 if a time trend is included. 0.131 0.339
Seasonal =1 if seasonal dummies are included. 0.146 0.354
No. of variables The logarithm of the number of endogenous variables included
in the VAR.
1.748 0.391
Industrial prod. =1 if industrial production is used as a measure of economic
activity.
0.429 0.496
Output gap =1 if the output gap is used as a measure of economic activity. 0.030 0.172
Other measures =1 if another measure of economic activity is used (employment,
expenditures).
0.121 0.327
Estimation characteristics
BVAR =1 if a Bayesian VAR is estimated. 0.121 0.327
FAVAR =1 if a factor-augmented VAR is estimated. 0.051 0.220
SVAR =1 if non-recursive identification is employed. 0.313 0.465
Sign restrictions =1 if sign restrictions are employed. 0.152 0.359
Publication characteristics
Strictly decreasing The reported impulse response function is strictly decreasing
(that is, it shows the maximum decrease in prices in the last
displayed horizon).
0.495 0.501
Price puzzle The reported impulse response exhibits the price puzzle. 0.530 0.500
Study citations The logarithm of [(Google Scholar citations of the study)/(age
of the study) + 1].
1.875 1.292
Impact The recursive RePEc impact factor of the outlet. 0.900 2.417
Central banker =1 if at least one co-author is affiliated with a central bank. 0.424 0.495
Policymaker =1 if at least one co-author is affiliated with a Ministry of Fi-
nance, IMF, OECD, or BIS.
0.061 0.239
Native =1 if at least one co-author is native to the investigated country. 0.449 0.499
Publication year The year of publication (2000 as a base). 4.894 3.889
Notes: The sources of data for country characteristics are Penn World Tables, the World Bank’s World Development
Indicators, and the International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics.
The results of the BMA estimation are reported graphically in Figure 3. The columns
represent individual regression models where the transmission lag is regressed on variables for
which the corresponding cell is not blank. For example, the explanatory variables in the first
model from the left are Financial development, Strictly decreasing, Monthly, CB independence,
Impact, and Price puzzle. The width of the columns is proportional to the so-called posterior
model probabilities; that is, it captures the weight each model gets in the BMA exercise. The
figure only shows the 5, 000 models with the highest posterior model probabilities. The best
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models are displayed on the left-hand side and are relatively parsimonious compared to those
with low posterior model probabilities. Explanatory variables in the figure are displayed in
descending order according to their posterior inclusion probabilities (the sum of the posterior
probabilities of the models they are included in). In other words, the variables at the top of the
figure are robustly important for the explanation of the variation in transmission lags, whereas
the variables at the bottom of the figure do not matter much.
The color of the cell corresponding to each variable included in a model represents the esti-
mated sign of the regression parameter. Blue (darker in grayscale) denotes a positive sign, and
red (lighter in grayscale) denotes a negative sign. For example, in the first model from the left
the estimated regression sign is positive for Financial development, positive for Strictly decreas-
ing, negative for Monthly, positive for CB independence, negative for Impact, and positive for
Price puzzle. As can be seen from the figure, variables with high posterior inclusion probabilities
usually exhibit quite stable regression signs. Nevertheless, for a more precise discussion of the
importance of individual variables (analogous to statistical significance in the frequentist case),
we need to turn to the numerical results of the BMA estimation, reported in Table 5.
Table 5 shows the posterior means (weighted averages of the models displayed in Figure 3)
for all regression parameters and the corresponding posterior standard deviations. According to
Masanjala & Papageorgiou (2008), variables with the ratio of the posterior mean to the posterior
standard deviation larger than 1.3 can be considered effective (or “statistically significant” in
the frequentist case). There are only three such variables: Financial development, Monthly,
and Strictly decreasing. First, our results suggest that a higher degree of financial development
in the country is associated with slower transmission of monetary policy shocks to the price
level. Moreover, when researchers use monthly data in the VAR system, they are more likely
to report shorter transmission lags. The BMA exercise also corroborates that the transmission
lags taken from strictly decreasing impulse responses are much longer than the lags taken from
hump-shaped impulse responses; the difference is approximately 26 months.
While many of the method characteristics appear to be relatively unimportant for the ex-
planation of the reported transmission lags, a few (for example, Sign restrictions or Output gap)
have moderate posterior inclusion probabilities. Because some of the method choices are gen-
erally considered misspecifications in the literature, we use the results of the BMA estimation
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Table 5: Why do transmission lags vary?
Variable PIP Posterior mean Posterior std. dev. Standardized coef.
Country characteristics
GDP per capita 0.099 -0.447 1.647 -0.0096
GDP growth 0.087 0.111 0.444 0.0059
Inflation 0.053 -0.337 1.918 -0.0025
Financial dev. 1.000 12.492 3.166 0.2630
Openness 0.029 -0.056 0.631 -0.0011
CB independence 0.705 13.370 10.412 0.1002
Data characteristics
Monthly 0.730 -4.175 3.036 -0.1045
No. of observations 0.127 -0.362 1.136 -0.0123
Average year 0.032 0.003 0.030 0.0012
Specification characteristics
GDP deflator 0.035 -0.052 0.584 -0.0010
Single regime 0.031 0.039 0.395 0.0009
No. of lags 0.023 0.014 0.436 0.0003
Commodity prices 0.022 -0.009 0.246 -0.0002
Money 0.026 -0.011 0.286 -0.0003
Foreign variables 0.030 0.039 0.385 0.0010
Time trend 0.472 3.681 4.480 0.0643
Seasonal 0.020 -0.004 0.307 -0.0001
No. of variables 0.028 0.036 0.400 0.0007
Industrial prod. 0.025 0.008 0.352 0.0002
Output gap 0.189 -1.464 3.566 -0.0130
Other measures 0.059 0.199 1.038 0.0034
Estimation characteristics
BVAR 0.096 0.337 1.278 0.0057
FAVAR 0.068 0.304 1.444 0.0034
SVAR 0.153 -0.468 1.303 -0.0112
Sign restrictions 0.200 0.954 2.232 0.0177
Publication characteristics
Strictly decreasing 1.000 26.122 1.798 0.6757
Price puzzle 0.383 1.359 1.999 0.0351
Study citations 0.039 -0.005 0.205 -0.0003
Impact 0.423 -0.305 0.414 -0.0381
Central banker 0.044 0.075 0.497 0.0019
Policymaker 0.149 0.858 2.426 0.0106
Native 0.091 -0.221 0.865 -0.0057
Publication year 0.048 0.011 0.070 0.0022
Constant 1.000 7.271 NA 0.3752
Notes: Estimated by Bayesian model averaging. Response variable: transmission lag (the number of months past to
the maximum decrease in prices taken from impulse responses). PIP = posterior inclusion probability. The posterior
mean is analogous to the estimate of the regression coefficient in a standard regression; the posterior standard deviation
is analogous to the standard error of the regression coefficient in a standard regression. Variables with posterior
mean larger than 1.3 posterior standard deviations are typeset in bold; we consider such variables effective (following
Masanjala & Papageorgiou, 2008).
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to filter out the effects of these misspecifications from the average transmission lag. In other
words, we define an ideal study with “best-practice” methodology and maximum publication
characteristics (for example the impact factor and the number of citations). Then we plug the
chosen values of the explanatory variables into the results of the BMA estimation and evaluate
the implied transmission lag.
For the definition of the “ideal” study we prefer the use of more observations in the VAR
system (that is, we plug in the sample maximum for variable No. of observations), more recent
data (Average year), the estimation of the VAR system over a period of a single monetary pol-
icy regime (Single regime), the inclusion of commodity prices in the VAR system (Commodity
prices), the inclusion of foreign variables (Foreign), the inclusion of seasonal dummies (Sea-
sonal), the inclusion of more variables in the VAR (No. of variables), the use of the output gap
as a measure of economic activity (Output gap; Industrial production and Other measures are
set to zero), the use of Bayesian VAR (BVAR), the use of sign restrictions (Sign restrictions;
FAVAR and SVAR are set to zero), more citations of the study (Study citations), and a higher
impact factor (Impact). All other variables are set to their sample means.
The average transmission lag implied by our definition of the ideal study is 29.2 months,
which is less than the simple average by approximately 4 months. The estimated transmission
lag hardly changes when FAVAR or SVAR are chosen for the definition of best-practice method-
ology; the result is also robust to other marginal changes to the definition. On the other hand,
the implied transmission lag decreases greatly if one prefers hump-shaped impulse responses:
in this case the estimated value is only 16.3 months. Moreover, if one prefers impulse responses
that do not exhibit the price puzzle, the implied value diminishes by another month. In sum,
when the effect of misspecifications is filtered out and one does not prefer any particular type
of impulse response, our results suggest that prices bottom out approximately two and a half
years after a monetary contraction.
4 Robustness Checks and Additional Results
Our analysis, based on the results of BMA, attributes the differences in transmission lags be-
tween (and within) developed and transition countries to differences in the level of financial
development. The BMA exercise carried out in the previous section controls for methodology
14
and other aspects associated with estimating impulse responses. Nevertheless, it is still useful
to illustrate that the differences in results between developed and transition countries are not
caused by differences in the frequency of reporting strictly decreasing impulse responses or im-
pulse responses showing the price puzzle. To this end, we replicate Table 3 but only focus on
the subsamples of impulse responses that are hump-shaped (Table 6) or that do not exhibit the
price puzzle (Table 7).
Table 6: Transmission lags differ across countries (hump-shaped impulse responses)
Developed economies Transition economies
Economy Average transmission lag Economy Average transmission lag
United States 23.2 Poland 15.4
Euro area 39.5 Czech Republic 14.8
Japan 40.5 Hungary 14.4
Germany 19.4 Slovakia 5.0
United Kingdom 10.0 Slovenia 13.0
France 24.0
Italy 9.2
Notes: The table shows the average number of months to the maximum decrease in prices taken from the impulse
responses reported for the corresponding country. Strictly decreasing impulse responses are omitted from this analysis.
Table 7: Transmission lags differ across countries (responses not showing the price puzzle)
Developed economies Transition economies
Economy Average transmission lag Economy Average transmission lag
United States 40.5 Poland 14.0
Euro area 49.2 Czech Republic 8.8
Japan 57.0 Hungary 15.4
Germany 34.5 Slovakia 10.7
United Kingdom 10.0 Slovenia 17.8
France 52.8
Italy 30.0
Notes: The table shows the average number of months to the maximum decrease in prices taken from the impulse
responses reported for the corresponding country. Impulse responses exhibiting the price puzzle are omitted from this
analysis.
The tables show that developed countries exhibit longer transmission lags even if strictly
decreasing impulse responses or impulse responses showing the price puzzle are disregarded.
But the difference is smaller for the subsample of hump-shaped impulse responses, where some
developed countries (for example, Italy) exhibit shorter transmission lags than some transition
countries (for example, Poland). There are two potential explanations of this result. First,
compared with Table 3, now we only have approximately half the number of observations, and
for some countries we are even left with less than five impulse responses, which makes the average
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number imprecise. Second, strictly decreasing impulse responses, which are associated with
longer transmission lags, are more often reported for developed economies than for transition
economies. The reason is that shorter data spans are available for transition countries, which
makes researchers often choose monthly data. Since monthly data are associated with shorter
reported lags, researchers investigating monetary transmission in transition countries are less
likely to report strictly decreasing impulse responses. Nevertheless, in the BMA estimation
we control for data frequency as well as for the shape of the impulse response, and financial
development still emerges as the most important factor causing cross-country differences in
transmission lags.
In our baseline model from the previous section we combine data from hump-shaped and
strictly decreasing impulse response functions. For strictly decreasing impulse responses, how-
ever, our definition of the transmission lag (the maximum effect of a monetary contraction on
prices) is influenced by the reporting window chosen by researchers. To see whether the result
concerning financial development is robust to omitting data from strictly decreasing impulse
response functions, we repeat the BMA estimation from the previous section using a subsample
of hump-shaped impulse responses.
The results are presented graphically in Figure 4. The variable corresponding to financial
development retain its estimated sign from the baseline model and still represents the most im-
portant country-level factor explaining the differences in monetary transmission lags. Compared
to the baseline model, in this specification additional method variables seem to be important.
The use of other measures than GDP, the output gap, or industrial production as a proxy
for economic activity is associated with slower reported transmission. The choice to represent
prices by the GDP deflator instead of the consumer price index on average translates into longer
transmission lags. Also the inclusion of foreign variables in the VAR system makes researchers
report slower transmission.
By excluding all strictly decreasing impulse responses, however, we lose half of the informa-
tion contained in our data set. For this reason we consider a second way of taking into account
the effect of the reporting window: censored regression. The reporting window of primary stud-
ies is often set to five years, so we use 60 months as the upper limit and estimate the regression
using the Tobit model. (Changing the upper limit to three or four years, which are sometimes
16
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used as the reporting window, does not qualitatively affect the results). Unfortunately, it is
cumbersome to estimate Tobit using BMA. Thus, we estimate a general model with all poten-
tial explanatory variables and then employ the general-to-specific approach. The general model
is reported in Table B1 in Appendix B. The inclusion of all potential explanatory variables,
many of which may not be important for explanation of the differences in transmission lags,
inflates the standard errors of the relevant variables. Hence, in the next step we eliminate the
insignificant variables one by one, starting from the least significant variable. As mentioned
before, the general-to-specific approach is far from perfect—but in this case it represents an
easy alternative to BMA.
Table 8: Censored regression, specific model
Response variable: transmission lag
GDP per capita -11.48
∗∗
(4.793)
Price puzzle 4.667
∗∗
(2.343)
Inflation -17.25
∗∗
(8.739)
Financial dev. 21.61
∗∗∗
(5.375)
Openness -12.67
∗∗∗
(4.670)
CB independence 29.38
∗∗∗
(10.64)
Monthly -12.04
∗∗∗
(3.821)
No. of observations 6.526
∗∗
(2.951)
Policymaker 12.37
∗∗
(5.012)
Constant 86.58
∗∗
(43.69)
Observations 198
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Estimated by Tobit with the upper limit for
transmission lags equal to 60 months. The specific model is a result of the backward
stepwise regression procedure applied to the general model, which is reported in Ap-
pendix B (the cut-off level for p-values was 0.1).
∗∗∗
,
∗∗
, and
∗
denote significance at
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
The results presented in Table 8 and Table B1 corroborate that, even using this methodology,
financial development is highly important for the explanation of transmission lags; in both
specifications it is significant at the 1% level. The use of monthly data is associated with
faster reported transmission, which is also consistent with the baseline model. In line with our
results from the previous sections, Table 8 suggests that impulse responses exhibiting the price
puzzle are likely to show longer transmission lags. In contrast to the baseline model, some
other variables seem to be important as well: GDP per capita, Inflation, and Openness, among
others. Because, however, the results concerning these variables are not confirmed by other
specifications, we do not want to put much emphasis on these variables. The variable Strictly
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decreasing, which was crucial for the baseline BMA estimation, is omitted from the present
analysis because it defines the censoring process.
So far we have analyzed the time it takes before a monetary contraction translates into the
maximum effect on the price level. The extent of the maximum effect, however, varies a lot
across different impulse responses. Therefore, as a complement to the previous analysis, we
collect data on how long it takes before a one-percentage-point increase in the policy rate leads
to a decrease in the price level of 0.1%. This number was chosen because most of the impulse
response functions in our sample (173 out of 198) reach this level at some point. In contrast, if
we chose a value of 0.5%, for example, we would have to disregard almost two thirds of all the
impulse responses.
The results of the BMA estimation using the new response variable are reported in Figure 5.
Again, the shape of the impulse response and the frequency of the data used in the VAR system
seem to be associated with the reported transmission lag. Financial development still belongs
among the most important country-level variables, together with central bank independence
and trade openness. According to this specification, monetary transmission is faster in countries
that are more open to international trade and that have a more independent central bank; these
results may point at the importance of the exchange rate and expectation channels of monetary
transmission. Additionally, some method variables matter for the estimated transmission lag:
for example, the use of sign restrictions, structural VAR, and seasonal adjustment. Our results
also suggest that articles published in journals with a high impact factor tend to present faster
monetary transmission.
5 Concluding Remarks
Building on a sample of 67 previous empirical studies, we examine why the reported trans-
mission lags of monetary policy vary. Our results suggest that the cross-country variation in
transmission is robustly associated with differences in financial development. To explain the
variation of results between different studies for the same country, the frequency of the data
used is important: the use of monthly data makes researchers report transmission faster by 4
months, holding other things constant. This is in line with Ghysels (2012), who shows that
responses from low- and high-frequency VARs may indeed differ due to mixed-frequency sam-
20
pling or temporal aggregation of shocks. The shape of the impulse response matters as well.
Strictly decreasing impulse responses, which may suggest that the underlying VAR system is
not stationary, exhibit much longer transmission lags.
The key result of our meta-analysis is that a higher degree of financial development trans-
lates into slower transmission of monetary policy. The finding can be interpreted in the following
way. If financial institutions lack opportunities to protect themselves against unexpected mon-
etary policy actions (due to either low levels of capitalization or low sophistication of financial
instruments provided by the undeveloped financial system), they need to react immediately
to monetary policy shocks, thus speeding up the transmission. In financially developed coun-
tries, in contrast, financial institutions have more opportunities to hedge against surprises in
monetary policy stance, causing greater delays in the transmission of monetary policy shocks.
This reasoning is in line with the so-called lending view of monetary transmission, which sug-
gests that financial intermediaries play a crucial role in the transmission of monetary policy
(Cecchetti, 1999).
More generally, our results imply that monetary transmission may slow down as the financial
system of transition and emerging countries develops, since financial innovations allow banks to
protect better against surprise shocks in monetary policy.
References
Andries, M. A. (2008): “Monetary Policy Transmission Mechanism in Romania—A VAR Approach.” Theoretical
and Applied Economics 11: pp. 250–260.
Anzuini, A. & A. Levy (2007): “Monetary Policy Shocks in the New EU Members: A VAR Approach.” Applied
Economics 39(7-9): pp. 1147–1161.
Arin, K. P. & S. P. Jolly (2005): “Trans-Tasman Transmission of Monetary Shocks: Evidence from a VAR
Approach.” Atlantic Economic Journal 33(3): pp. 267–283.
Arnone, M., B. J. Laurens, J.-F. Segalotto, & M. Sommer (2009): “Central Bank Autonomy: Lessons from
Global Trends.” IMF Staff Papers 56(2): pp. 263–296.
Ashenfelter, O. & M. Greenstone (2004): “Estimating the Value of a Statistical Life: The Importance of
Omitted Variables and Publication Bias.” American Economic Review 94(2): pp. 454–460.
Bagliano, F. C. & C. A. Favero (1998): “Measuring Monetary Policy with VAR Models: An Evaluation.”
European Economic Review 42(6): pp. 1069–1112.
Bagliano, F. C. & C. A. Favero (1999): “Information from Financial Markets and VAR Measures of Monetary
Policy.” European Economic Review 43(4-6): pp. 825 – 837.
Banbura, M., D. Giannone, & L. Reichlin (2010): “Large Bayesian vector auto regressions.” Journal of
Applied Econometrics 25(1): pp. 71–92.
21
Bank of England (1999): “The Transmission Mechanism of Monetary Policy. A Paper by the Monetary Policy
Committee.” Bank of England, April 1999.
Batini, N. & E. Nelson (2001): “The Lag from Monetary Policy Actions to Inflation: Friedman Revisited.”
International Finance 4(3): pp. 381–400.
Belviso, F. & F. Milani (2006): “Structural Factor-Augmented VARs (SFAVARs) and the Effects of Monetary
Policy.” B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics: Topics in Macroeconomics 6(3): pp. 1–44.
Bernanke, B., J. Boivin, & P. S. Eliasz (2005): “Measuring the Effects of Monetary Policy: A Factor-
augmented Vector Autoregressive (FAVAR) Approach.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 120(1): pp.
387–422.
Bernanke, B. S., M. Gertler, & M. Watson (1997): “Systematic Monetary Policy and the Effects of Oil Price
Shocks.” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1(1): pp. 91–142.
Boivin, J. & M. P. Giannoni (2007): “Global Forces and Monetary Policy Effectiveness.” In “International
Dimensions of Monetary Policy,” NBER Chapters, pp. 429–478. National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Boivin, J., M. P. Giannoni, & B. Mojon (2008): “How Has the Euro Changed the Monetary Transmission?”
In “NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2008,” NBER Chapters. National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Borys, M., R. Horvath, & M. Franta (2009): “The effects of monetary policy in the Czech Republic: an
empirical study.” Empirica 36(4): pp. 419–443.
Bredin, D. & G. O’Reilly (2004): “An Analysis of the Transmission Mechanism of Monetary Policy in Ireland.”
Applied Economics 36(1): pp. 49–58.
Brissimis, S. N. & N. S. Magginas (2006): “Forward-Looking Information in VAR Models and the Price Puzzle.”
Journal of Monetary Economics 53(6): pp. 1225–1234.
Brunner, A. D. (2000): “On the Derivation of Monetary Policy Shocks: Should We Throw the VAR out with
the Bath Water?” Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 32(2): pp. 254–279.
Buckle, R. A., K. Kim, H. Kirkham, N. McLellan, & J. Sharma (2007): “A Structural VAR Business Cycle
Model for a Volatile Small Open Economy.” Economic Modelling 24(6): pp. 990–1017.
Card, D., J. Kluve, & A. Weber (2010): “Active Labor Market Policy Evaluations: A Meta-analysis.” The
Economic Journal 120(548): pp. F452–F477.
Cecchetti, S. G. (1999): “Legal structure, financial structure, and the monetary policy transmission mecha-
nism.” Federal Reserve Bank of New York Economic Policy Review 5(2): pp. 9–28.
Cespedes, B., E. Lima, & A. Maka (2008): “Monetary Policy, Inflation and the Level of Economic Activity in
Brazil after the Real Plan: Stylized Facts from SVAR Models.” Revista Brasileira de Economia 62(2): pp.
123–160.
Christiano, L. J., M. Eichenbaum, & C. Evans (1996): “The Effects of Monetary Policy Shocks: Evidence
from the Flow of Funds.” The Review of Economics and Statistics 78(1): pp. 16–34.
Christiano, L. J., M. Eichenbaum, & C. L. Evans (1999): “Monetary policy shocks: What have we learned
and to what end?” In J. B. Taylor & M. Woodford (editors), “Handbook of Macroeconomics,” volume 1
of Handbook of Macroeconomics, chapter 2, pp. 65–148. Elsevier.
Cushman, D. O. & T. Zha (1997): “Identifying monetary policy in a small open economy under flexible exchange
rates.” Journal of Monetary Economics 39(3): pp. 433–448.
De Arcangelis, G. & G. Di Giorgio (2001): “Measuring Monetary Policy Shocks in a Small Open Economy.”
Economic Notes 30(1): pp. 81–107.
Dedola, L. & F. Lippi (2005): “The monetary transmission mechanism: Evidence from the industries of five
OECD countries.” European Economic Review 49(6): pp. 1543–1569.
Disdier, A.-C. & K. Head (2008): “The Puzzling Persistence of the Distance Effect on Bilateral Trade.” The
22
Review of Economics and Statistics 90(1): pp. 37–48.
Dornbusch, R., C. Favero, F. Giavazzi, H. Genberg, & A. K. Rose (1998): “Immediate Challenges for the
European Central Bank.” Economic Policy 13(26): pp. 17–64.
Durlauf, S., A. Kourtellos, & C. Tan (2008): “Are Any Growth Theories Robust?” Economic Journal
118(527): pp. 329–346.
EFN (2004): “Monetary transmission in acceding countries.” In “European Forecasting Network Annex 53,” p.
97–142. European University Institute.
Ehrmann, M. (2000): “Comparing Monetary Policy Transmission across European Countries.” Review of World
Economics 136(1): pp. 58 – 83.
Ehrmann, M., L. Gambacorta, J. Martinez-Pages, P. Sevestre, & A. Worms (2003): “The Effects of
Monetary Policy in the Euro Area.” Oxford Review of Economic Policy 19(1): pp. 58–72.
Eichenbaum, M. (1992): “Comment on ‘Interpreting the macroeconomic time series facts: The effects of mone-
tary policy’.” European Economic Review 36(5): pp. 1001–1011.
Eicher, T. S., C. Papageorgiou, & A. E. Raftery (2011): “Default priors and predictive performance in
Bayesian model averaging, with application to growth determinants.” Journal of Applied Econometrics 26(1):
pp. 30–55.
Eickmeier, S., B. Hofmann, & A. Worms (2009): “Macroeconomic Fluctuations and Bank Lending: Evidence
for Germany and the Euro Area.” German Economic Review 10: pp. 193–223.
Elbourne, A. (2008): “The UK Housing Market and the Monetary Policy Transmission Mechanism: An SVAR
Approach.” Journal of Housing Economics 17(1): pp. 65–87.
Elbourne, A. & J. de Haan (2006): “Financial structure and monetary policy transmission in transition
countries.” Journal of Comparative Economics 34(1): pp. 1–23.
Elbourne, A. & J. de Haan (2009): “Modeling Monetary Policy Transmission in Acceding Countries: Vector
Autoregression versus Structural Vector Autoregression.” Emerging Markets Finance and Trade 45(2): pp.
4–20.
European Central Bank (2010): “Monthly Bulletin.” European Central Bank, May 2010.
Feldkircher, M. & S. Zeugner (2009): “Benchmark Priors Revisited: On Adaptive Shrinkage and the Super-
model Effect in Bayesian Model Averaging.” IMF Working Papers 09/202, International Monetary Fund.
Fernandez, C., E. Ley, & M. F. J. Steel (2001): “Model uncertainty in cross-country growth regressions.”
Journal of Applied Econometrics 16(5): pp. 563–576.
Forni, M. & L. Gambetti (2010): “The dynamic effects of monetary policy: A structural factor model ap-
proach.” Journal of Monetary Economics 57(2): pp. 203–216.
Friedman, M. (1972): “Have Monetary Policies Failed?” American Economic Review 62(2): pp. 11–18.
Fujiwara, I. (2004): “Output Composition of the Monetary Policy Transmission Mechanism in Japan.” Topics
in Macroeconomics 4(1): pp. 1–21.
Gan, W. B. & L. Y. Soon (2003): “Characterizing the Monetary Transmission Mechanism in a Small Open
Economy: The Case of Malaysia.” Singapore Economic Review 48(2): pp. 113–134.
Ghysels, E. (2012): “Macroeconomics and the Reality of Mixed Frequency Data.” University of North Carolina
(UNC) at Chapel Hill - Department of Economics. mimeo.
Goodhart, C. A. (2001): “Monetary transmission lags and the formulation of the policy decision on interest
rates.” Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (Jul): pp. 165–186.
Hanson, M. S. (2004): “The price puzzle reconsidered.” Journal of Monetary Economics 51(7): pp. 1385–1413.
Havranek, T. & Z. Irsova (2011): “Estimating vertical spillovers from FDI: Why results vary and what the
23
true effect is.” Journal of International Economics 85(2): pp. 234–244.
Horvath, R. & M. Rusnak (2009): “How Important Are Foreign Shocks in a Small Open Economy? The Case
of Slovakia.” Global Economy Journal 9(1).
Hulsewig, O., E. Mayer, & T. Wollmershauser (2006): “Bank Loan Supply and Monetary Policy Transmis-
sion in Germany: An Assessment Based on Matching Impulse Responses.” Journal of Banking and Finance
30(10): pp. 2893–2910.
Jang, K. & M. Ogaki (2004): “The Effects of Monetary Policy Shocks on Exchange Rates: A Structural Vector
Error Correction Model Approach.” Journal of the Japanese and International Economies 18(1): pp. 99–114.
Jarocinski, M. (2009): “Responses to monetary policy shocks in the east and the west of Europe: a comparison.”
Journal of Applied Econometrics 25(5): pp. 833–868.
Jarocinski, M. (2010): “Responses to monetary policy shocks in the east and the west of Europe: a comparison.”
Journal of Applied Econometrics 25(5): pp. 833–868.
Jarocinski, M. & F. R. Smets (2008): “House Prices and the Stance of Monetary Policy.” Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis Review 90(4): pp. 339–365.
Kim, S. (2001): “International Transmission of U.S. Monetary Policy Shocks: Evidence from VARs.” Journal of
Monetary Economics 48(2): pp. 339–372.
Kim, S. (2002): “Exchange rate stabilization in the ERM: identifying European monetary policy reactions.”
Journal of International Money and Finance 21(3): pp. 413–434.
Koop, G. (2003): Bayesian Econometrics. John Wiley & Sons.
Krusec, D. (2010): “The price puzzle in the monetary transmission VARs with long-run restrictions.” Economics
Letters 106(3): pp. 147–150.
Kubo, A. (2008): “Macroeconomic Impact of Monetary Policy Shocks: Evidence from Recent Experience in
Thailand.” Journal of Asian Economics 19(1): pp. 83–91.
Lagana, G. & A. Mountford (2005): “Measuring Monetary Policy in the UK: A Factor-Augmented Vector
Autoregression Model Approach.” Manchester School 73(s1): pp. 77–98.
Lange, R. H. (2010): “Regime-switching monetary policy in Canada.” Journal of Macroeconomics 32(3): pp.
782–796.
Leeper, E. M., C. A. Sims, & T. Zha (1996): “What Does Monetary Policy Do?” Brookings Papers on Economic
Activity 27(2): pp. 1–78.
Li, Y. D., T. B. Iscan, & K. Xu (2010): “The impact of monetary policy shocks on stock prices: Evidence from
Canada and the United States.” Journal of International Money and Finance 29(5): pp. 876–896.
Lu¨tkepohl, H. (2005): New Introduction to Multiple Time Series Analysis. Springer-Verlag.
Masanjala, W. H. & C. Papageorgiou (2008): “Rough and lonely road to prosperity: a reexamination of the
sources of growth in Africa using Bayesian model averaging.” Journal of Applied Econometrics 23(5): pp.
671–682.
McMillin, W. D. (2001): “The Effects of Monetary Policy Shocks: Comparing Contemporaneous versus Long-
Run Identifying Restrictions.” Southern Economic Journal 67(3): pp. 618–636.
Mertens, K. (2008): “Deposit rate ceilings and monetary transmission in the US.” Journal of Monetary Eco-
nomics 55(7): pp. 1290–1302.
Minella, A. (2003): “Monetary Policy and Inflation in Brazil (1975-2000): A VAR Estimation.” Revista
Brasileira de Economia 57(3): pp. 605–635.
Mojon, B. (2008): “When Did Unsystematic Monetary Policy Have an Effect on Inflation?” European Economic
Review 52(3): pp. 487–497.
24
Mojon, B. & G. Peersman (2001): “A VAR description of the effects of monetary policy in the individual
countries of the Euro area.” Working Paper Series 092, European Central Bank.
Mojon, B. & G. Peersman (2003): “A VAR description of the effects of monetary policy in the individual
countries of the Euro area.” In A. K. I Angeloni & B. Mojon (editors), “Monetary Policy Transmission in
the Euro Area,” chapter 1, pp. 56–74. Cambridge University Press.
Moral-Benito, E. (2011): “Model averaging in economics.” Banco de Espana Working Papers 1123, Banco de
Espana.
Mountford, A. (2005): “Leaning into the Wind: A Structural VAR Investigation of UK Monetary Policy.”
Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 67(5): pp. 597–621.
Nakashima, K. (2006): “The Bank of Japan’s Operating Procedures and the Identification of Monetary Policy
Shocks: A Reexamination Using the Bernanke-Mihov Approach.” Journal of the Japanese and International
Economies 20(3): pp. 406–433.
Normandin, M. & L. Phaneuf (2004): “Monetary Policy Shocks: Testing Identification Conditions under
Time-Varying Conditional Volatility.” Journal of Monetary Economics 51(6): pp. 1217–1243.
Oros, C. & C. Romocea-Turcu (2009): “The Monetary Transmission Mechanisms In The CEECs: A Structural
VAR Approach.” Applied Econometrics and International Development 9(2): pp. 73–86.
Peersman, G. (2004): “The Transmission of Monetary Policy in the Euro Area: Are the Effects Different across
Countries?” Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 66(3): pp. 285–308.
Peersman, G. (2005): “What Caused the Early Millennium Slowdown? Evidence Based on Vector Autoregres-
sions.” Journal of Applied Econometrics 20(2): pp. 185–207.
Peersman, G. & F. Smets (2001): “The monetary transmission mechanism in the Euro area: more evidence
from VAR analysis.” Working Paper Series 091, European Central Bank.
Peersman, G. & R. Straub (2009): “Technology Shocks and Robust Sign Restrictions in a Euro Area SVAR.”
International Economic Review 50(3): pp. 727–750.
Pobre, M. L. (2003): “Sources of Shocks and Monetary Policy in the 1997 Asian Crisis: The Case of Korea and
Thailand.” Osaka Economic Papers 53(3): pp. 362–373.
Rafiq, M. S. & S. K. Mallick (2008): “The Effect of Monetary Policy on Output in EMU3: A Sign Restriction
Approach.” Journal of Macroeconomics 30(4): pp. 1756–1791.
Romer, C. D. & D. H. Romer (2004): “A New Measure of Monetary Shocks: Derivation and Implications.”
American Economic Review 94(4): pp. 1055–1084.
Rusnak, M., T. Havranek, & R. Horvath (2012): “How to Solve the Price Puzzle? A Meta-Analysis.” Journal
of Money, Credit and Banking (forthcoming).
Sala-I-Martin, X., G. Doppelhofer, & R. I. Miller (2004): “Determinants of Long-Term Growth: A Bayesian
Averaging of Classical Estimates (BACE) Approach.” American Economic Review 94(4): pp. 813–835.
Shioji, E. (2000): “Identifying Monetary Policy Shocks in Japan.” Journal of the Japanese and International
Economies 14(1): pp. 22–42.
Sims, C. A. & T. Zha (1998): “Bayesian Methods for Dynamic Multivariate Models.” International Economic
Review 39(4): pp. 949–68.
Smets, F. (1997): “Measuring Monetary Policy Shocks in France, Germany and Italy: The Role of the Exchange
Rate.” Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics 133(3): pp. 597–616.
Sousa, J. & A. Zaghini (2008): “Monetary Policy Shocks in the Euro Area and Global Liquidity Spillovers.”
International Journal of Finance and Economics 13(3): pp. 205–218.
Stanley, T. D. (2001): “Wheat from Chaff: Meta-analysis as Quantitative Literature Review.” Journal of
Economic Perspectives 15(3): pp. 131–150.
25
Taylor, J. B. & V. Wieland (2012): “Surprising Comparative Properties of Monetary Models: Results from a
New Monetary Model Base.” Review of Economics and Statistics (forthcoming).
Vargas-Silva, C. (2008): “Monetary Policy and the US Housing Market: A VAR Analysis Imposing Sign
Restrictions.” Journal of Macroeconomics 30(3): pp. 977–990.
Voss, G. & L. Willard (2009): “Monetary policy and the exchange rate: Evidence from a two-country model.”
Journal of Macroeconomics 31(4): pp. 708–720.
Wu, T. (2003): “Stylized Facts on Nominal Term Structure and Business Cycles: An Empirical VAR Study.”
Applied Economics 35(8): pp. 901–906.
26
A Diagnostics of Bayesian Model Averaging
Table A1: Summary of BMA estimation (baseline model)
Mean no. regressors Draws Burn-ins Time
8.1261 2 · 108 1 · 108 11.88852 hours
No. models visited Modelspace Visited Topmodels
83, 511, 152 8.6 · 109 0.97% 34%
Corr PMP No. Obs. Model Prior g-Prior
0.9999 198 uniform / 16.5 UIP
Shrinkage-Stats
Av= 0.995
Notes: UIP = unit information prior, PMP = posterior model probability.
Figure A1: Model size and convergence (baseline model)
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Table A2: Summary of BMA estimation (hump-shaped impulse responses)
Mean no. regressors Draws Burn-ins Time
10.7143 2 · 108 1 · 108 12.15215 hours
No. models visited Modelspace Visited Topmodels
104, 093, 439 4.3 · 109 2.4% 16%
Corr PMP No. Obs. Model Prior g-Prior
0.9997 100 uniform / 16 UIP
Shrinkage-Stats
Av= 0.9901
Notes: UIP = unit information prior, PMP = posterior model probability.
Figure A2: Model size and convergence (hump-shaped impulse responses)
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Table A3: Summary of BMA estimation (time to −0.1% decrease in prices)
Mean no. regressors Draws Burn-ins Time
9.6899 2 · 108 1 · 108 12.0976 hours
No. models visited Modelspace Visited Topmodels
87, 125, 827 8.6 · 109 1% 30%
Corr PMP No. Obs. Model Prior g-Prior
0.9999 173 uniform / 16.5 UIP
Shrinkage-Stats
Av= 0.9943
Notes: UIP = unit information prior, PMP = posterior model probability.
Figure A3: Model size and convergence (time to −0.1% decrease in prices)
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B Results of Censored Regression
Table B1: Censored regression, general model (all variables are included)
Response variable: transmission lag
Country characteristics
GDP per capita -9.792
∗
(5.192)
GDP growth 1.512 (1.346)
Inflation -17.41
∗∗
(8.695)
Financial dev. 22.17
∗∗∗
(6.084)
Openness -11.16
∗∗
(5.595)
CB independence 30.20
∗∗
(12.27)
Data characteristics
Monthly -4.402 (6.920)
No. of observations 4.287 (5.186)
Average year -0.168 (0.367)
Specification characteristics
GDP deflator 5.102 (4.281)
Single regime 4.143 (3.497)
No. of lags 8.132
∗
(4.744)
Commodity prices -1.284 (2.861)
Money 1.768 (2.949)
Foreign variables 4.102 (3.400)
Time trend 2.700 (5.791)
Seasonal 7.231
∗
(4.057)
No. of variables 1.352 (3.536)
Industrial prod. -6.785
∗
(3.904)
Output gap -10.41 (7.681)
Other measures -6.246 (5.017)
Estimation characteristics
BVAR -1.147 (5.094)
FAVAR 14.53
∗∗
(6.525)
SVAR -4.243 (3.008)
Sign restrictions -3.270 (5.163)
Publication characteristics
Price puzzle 3.651 (2.537)
Study citations -0.717 (1.734)
Impact -0.742 (0.699)
Central banker 5.313 (3.633)
Policymaker 9.024 (6.137)
Native -1.996 (3.043)
Publication year 0.0475 (0.453)
Constant 62.32 (50.10)
Observations 198
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Estimated by Tobit with the upper limit for
transmission lags equal to 60 months.
∗∗∗
,
∗∗
, and
∗
denote significance at the 1%,
5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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